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The Uzbek Growth Puzzle 
JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER*
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan’s output fell less than in any
other former Soviet republic, and growth turned positive in 1996/97. Given the
country’s hesitant and idiosyncratic approach to reforms, this record has surprised
many observers. This paper first shows that a standard panel model of growth in
transition systematically underpredicts Uzbek growth from 1992–1996, confirming
the view that Uzbekistan’s performance constitutes a puzzle. It then attempts to
resolve the puzzle by extending the model in a way that encompasses competing
hypotheses of what makes Uzbekistan’s output path unusual. The main result is
that Uzbekistan’s performance can be accounted for by a combination of low
initial industrialization, its cotton production, and its self-sufficiency in energy.
[JEL: O53, P24, P27, P52]
B
y any measure, the decline in output in Uzbekistan since the beginning of
transition has been relatively mild. According to IMF data based on offi-
cial statistics, 1997 Uzbek output stood at about 85 percent of its 1991 level, as
compared to an average of 60 percent for the Baltics, Russia, and other coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union (hereafter BRO; see Table 1). Total cumulative
output loss was only 59 percent of 1991 output by 1995 and 89 percent by
1997—as opposed to 126 and 207 percent, respectively, for the BRO average.
Output estimates based on electricity consumption—sometimes regarded as
preferable because they better capture informal sector output—indicate that
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>these differences may be exaggerated,1 but they corroborate the finding that
Uzbekistan’s output decline was far milder than that in the other countries.
Uzbekistan appeared to resume positive growth in 1996 and 1997, ahead of
other large BRO economies, such as Russia and Ukraine, which continued to
decline in 1996 and were at best stagnant in 1997. Finally, it is worth noting
that Uzbekistan’s transitional recession was mild not only relative to the BRO
average but also relative to the average of the Central and Eastern European
transition economies (see Figure 1).
Observers are often puzzled by Uzbekistan’s output performance, typically
because they think that the country could have done much worse given its hesitancy
to engage in rapid market-oriented reforms and sustained macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion—policies that have been widely credited with contributing toward milder transi-
tional recessions and quicker and stronger recoveries.2 In Uzbekistan, liberalization
has proceeded hesitantly and with occasional reversals—in particular, with regard to
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1This is driven by a larger downward bias to official output measurement in the other 14 countries due
to faster informal sector growth; see Taube and Zettelmeyer (1998).
2Berg and others (1999); de Melo and others (1997); Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998);
Hernández-Catá (1997); Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1996a and b); Sachs (1996); Åslund, Boone, and
Johnson (1996); Selowsky and Martin (1997); Wolf (1997); and World Bank (1996).
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1Transition time refers to years since the beginning of transition (defined as transition year 0). This is
assumed to be 1992 for the Baltics, Russia, and the other countries of the former Soviet Union; 1990 for
Poland, Hungary, and the former Yugoslavia; and 1991 for the remaining Central and Eastern European
transition economies. its external regime—and structural policies have concentrated on public investments
that aimed at substituting energy and industrial imports, along with an extensive sys-
tem of transfers to the largely state-controlled industrial sector.3At the same time, the
output decline was arrested relatively quickly following limited stabilization, in spite
of macroeconomic imbalances that re-emerged in late 1996 and 1997. Puzzling or
not, what explains this relatively good performance? The fact that Uzbekistan did not
follow standard market-oriented economic reforms makes this question all the more
interesting, and poses a challenge to the standard policy prescription.
The paper proceeds in two steps. First, it asks if there really is a puzzle.
Obviously, structural reforms and macroeconomic policies may not be the only—
or perhaps even the main—determinants of output in transition. Other variables,
such as initial conditions, also matter. The question is whether Uzbekistan’s per-
formance is still puzzling once these variables are taken into account in the con-
text of a standard cross-country regression model. Second, to the extent that
standard explanatory variables cannot fully explain Uzbekistan’s output path,
what are alternative explanations? This is addressed by extending the basic regres-
sion model in a way that seeks to encompass competing hypotheses of what could
have contributed to Uzbekistan’s unusual output path. 
The main result is that the Uzbek growth puzzle can be “resolved” in an
accounting sense after controlling for its low degree of initial industrialization,
production of agricultural commodities (including cotton), and the energy balance.
Public investment, which has also been cited as a possible reason for Uzbekistan’s
relative success, seems to have little or no explanatory power. One interpretation
of these results is simply that favorable initial conditions, rather than policies,
should be credited with Uzbekistan’s output performance. An alternative interpre-
tation is that Uzbekistan’s policy of subsidizing the official industrial sector was
relatively successful in mitigating the output decline, given a low degree of indus-
trialization to begin with, because it could be financed through export proceeds
from agriculture and because of the availability of domestic energy. In this view,
the combination of go-slow policies with favorable initial conditions achieved a
result that eluded other former communist countries that tried similar approaches,
but ran into financing constraints much earlier. 
I. Is There A Puzzle?
This section of the paper is based on a panel regression model of the main deter-
minants of output growth during transition estimated by Berg and others (1999)
using data for 26 transition economies.4 The model is flexible in that it has a very
general dynamic structure, does not assume that policies and initial conditions
necessarily have the same effects on the private and the state sectors, and consid-
ers a large number of potential determinants of growth, which are reduced using a
general-to-specific methodology. These include macroeconomic variables (fiscal
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3For details, see IMF (1998, 1997).
4Berg and others also discuss other variants of the model, which have similar implications as the
version used here.balance and inflation, instrumented using IMF program targets); structural reform
indices (constructed by de Melo and others, 1996a, b, and updated using the
reform indices of the EBRD Transition Reports); initial conditions, including vari-
ables capturing initial structure (overindustrialization, initial share of agriculture,
trade dependency); initial PPP-adjusted income; initial macroeconomic distortions
(as measured by measures of repressed inflation and/or inflation and fiscal balance
in the year prior to the beginning of transition); the initial state of reforms; and
some other controls, including a dummy for wars.
Table 2 compares fitted and actual growth in “transition time” (time since the
end of central planning) for (1) an average of 25 transition economies excluding
Uzbekistan, (2) an average of the Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the for-
mer Soviet Union, again excluding Uzbekistan, and (3) Uzbekistan. “Year zero” is
defined as the year in which central planning ended (1992 in Uzbekistan and the
BRO and 1990 or 1991 in the remaining transition economies in the sample; see
note to Figure 1). In addition to showing the residuals in each group as the differ-
ence between fitted and actual growth, the table shows the average of the absolute
residuals across countries in the transition and BRO groups, respectively. This per-
mits a comparison of the absolute magnitude of the residual for Uzbekistan with
that of a “typical” transition country.
The main results from the table are as follows. First, the model correctly predicts
a higher growth for Uzbekistan in the first two years of transition relative to the aver-
age, that is, a smaller output decline. Consequently, we can get some insights into
the relatively good Uzbek output performance during 1992–93 by looking into what
drives the model’s predictions (see below). Second, the model systematically under-
predicts Uzbek growth. The underprediction is particularly impressive for 1994
(year 2 in transition time), when the model predicts a large collapse in output that
did not materialize. As a result, the total regression residual for Uzbekistan (as mea-
sured by the cross sum of the five annual absolute residuals) is much larger than that
for the typical transition country or BRO economy (28.7 versus 18.5 and 17.0,
respectively). A Chow test for predictive stability confirms that this difference is
much larger than what could reasonably be attributed to chance.5
Based on the model by Berg and others, it thus certainly seems justified to
speak of an “Uzbek growth puzzle.” To resolve this puzzle, one must look beyond
this model. Before doing this, however, we seek to understand the variables that
drive the existing model’s limited capacity to explain Uzbek growth performance,
and in particular the differences between the Uzbek fitted path and the average fit-
ted path for the other transition economies (Table 3).
Table 3 decomposes the fitted values for Uzbekistan and the group of remaining
14 countries into the contribution of the main groups of explanatory variables.6
To the extent that the standard model can explain Uzbekistan’s output path in the first
two years, it does not attribute Uzbekistan’s relatively favorable performance to its
macroeconomic policies and the (slow) pace of its structural reforms. On both fronts,
Jeromin Zettelmeyer
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5The null hypothesis of no structural break is rejected at the 5 percent level (p-value: 2.7 percent).
6This decomposition is possible because the model does not contain lagged dependent variables.
Thus, at any point in time, the fitted value of the model can be written as a linear combination of the inde-
pendent variables. See Zettelmeyer (1998) for a more detailed decomposition.THE UZBEK GROWTH PUZZLE
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Uzbekistan performed worse than the average of transition economies, according to
Table 3. This is not surprising, since the Berg and others cross-country model associ-
ates fast reforms with faster output recovery, based on the experience of most other
transition economies. Instead, Table 3 attributes the relatively good performance of
Uzbekistan in the first two years of transition to unusually favorable initial conditions,
which more than offset the unfavorable impact of slow structural reforms and
macroeconomic imbalances in that period. An unbundling of these initial conditions
shows that this is mainly driven by one variable, “overindustrialization,” which cap-
tures the degree of industrialization at the beginning of transition relative to the indus-
trialization typical for a market economy in the same range of GDP per capita.7
According to the dataset of de Melo and others (1997), from which the data
documenting initial conditions were taken, Uzbekistan’s industry share was actually
smaller than what would have been expected based on its GDP per capita. Thus,
according to the standard model, Uzbekistan did better than the average transition
Table 2. Uzbekistan and Transition Economy Average: 
Fitted and Actual Growth Paths Based on the Model by Berg and Others
(in percent per year)
Transition Time
0 1 2 3 4 5
Average of transition 
countries excluding Uzbekistan
Actual growth –21.3 –12.5 –9.8 –1.5 1.6 2.6
Fitted growth –20.9 –12.7 –9.1 –1.6 1.7 3.4
Residual –0.4 0.2 –0.7 0.1 0.0 –0.8
Average of absolute residual 3.3 3.1 4.2 3.1 3.3 2.4
Average of the Baltics, Russia, 
and other countries of the 
former Soviet Union Union,
excluding Uzbekistan
Actual growth –25.8 –14.1 –13.3 –3.9 –0.2 . . .
Fitted growth –24.7 –14.6 –12.3 –4.1 0.1 . . .
Residual –1.1 0.5 –1.0 0.2 –0.3 . . .
Average of absolute residual 4.2 3.2 4.6 2.9 3.7 . . .
Uzbekistan
Actual growth –11.1 –2.3 –4.2 –0.9 1.6 . . .
Fitted growth –15.6 –6.4 –18.9 –4.7 0.0 . . .
Residual 4.5 4.1 14.7 3.8 1.6 . . .
Absolute residual 4.5 4.1 14.7 3.8 1.6 . . .
7More precisely, “overindustrialization” is defined as the difference between the actual share of
industry in the country in 1989 and the share that would have been predicted on the basis of the coun-
try’s per capital income. The latter is obtained as the fitted value from a regression of industrial share on
per capita income in a large sample of market economies. For more details, see de Melo and others
(1997) and references cited therein.economy in the first two years mainly because it was less industrialized in the first
place, and as such had a smaller share of output that was vulnerable to collapse after
the end of central planning.
However, Uzbekistan’s lack of industrialization would only have retarded,
but not eliminated, the output collapse according to the model by Berg and oth-
ers. Since the destructive effect of “overindustrialization” is concentrated in the
first two years, the comparative advantage afforded by Uzbekistan’s initial eco-
nomic structure should mostly have been lost after that period.8Aside from low
Jeromin Zettelmeyer
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Table 3. Uzbekistan and Transition Economy Average: 
Decomposition of Fitted Growth (Berg and others Model)
(in percent per year)
Transition Time
0 1 2 3 4
Average of Baltics, Russia, 
and other countries of the 
former Soviet Union, 
excluding Uzbekistan
Fitted growth –24.7 –14.6 –12.3 –4.1 0.1
Macroeconomic policy –2.6 1.0 –0.7 0.3 0.6
Structural reforms 3.7 4.0 5.6 9.4 10.5
War –3.0 –3.0 –0.7 –0.2 –0.2
Constant –8.9 –8.9 –8.9 –8.9 –8.9
Initial conditions –13.9 –7.8 –7.6 –4.8 –2.0
Trade dependency –8.2 –5.5 –2.9 –0.2 2.5
Overindustrialization –8.5 –5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Urbanization + agriculture 4.1 –1.9 –3.7 –3.7 –3.7
Other1 –1.3 5.3 –1.1 –0.9 –0.8
Uzbekistan
Fitted growth –15.6 –6.4 –18.9 –4.7 0.0
Macroeconomic policy –4.3 0.0 –3.5 0.0 2.2
Structural reforms 0.6 –0.5 –0.6 7.3 7.3
War 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Constant –8.9 –8.9 –8.9 –8.9 –8.9
Initial conditions –3.0 2.9 –5.9 –3.3 –0.6
Trade dependency –8.0 –5.6 –3.2 –0.8 1.5
Overindustrialization 3.4 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Urbanization + agriculture 5.5 –0.6 –1.3 –1.3 –1.3
Other1 –3.9 7.0 –1.3 –1.1 –0.8
1Initial macroeconomic imbalances (estimated repressed inflation in the five years prior to tran-
sition; deficits and inflation in the last year prior to transition), pre-transition structural reforms, and
a dummy for the resource-rich countries (Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan).
8This is what explains the peculiar time path of the “initial conditions” line of Table 3 for Uzbekistan,
which contrasts with the nicely upward-sloping path for the BRO average. In year zero, Uzbekistan’s “under-
industrialized” initial state mitigates but does not quite offset the negative impact of the remaining initial con-
ditions, whereas in year one the latter is slightly more than offset. In year two, the offsetting effect disappears.initial industrialization, the remaining initial conditions measured by Berg and
others do not show Uzbekistan in a substantially better position than the other
countries. In light of the downward trend to output (reflected in the regression
constant), which the model by Berg and others attributes to the transition phe-
nomenon over and above what is attributable to individual variables, and
Uzbekistan’s failure to offset this trend by more vigorous market-oriented
reform policies, the model would have predicted the output decline to set in
with a vengeance in year three. But this did not happen.
II. Explaining the Uzbek Growth Puzzle: Econometric Findings
To shed some light on the remaining “growth puzzle,” this section extends the
model of the previous section to encompass several “explanations” of the growth
puzzle that have been suggested in the past. In particular, it includes variables
reflecting the dollar value of cash crops and natural resources (including energy
and non-ferrous metals), as well as the energy balance; and capital expenditure of
the general government, as a measure of public investment.9
The extension of the basic model to include public investment variables is
motivated primarily by the Uzbek government’s view that its strategy of diversi-
fying economic output away from agriculture and raw materials and toward the
industrial sector, with a view toward substituting imports, has been a crucial fac-
tor in explaining Uzbekistan’s relative success.10 In addition to attracting some
foreign direct investment (FDI), much of this import substitution and industrial-
ization strategy took the form of government-directed and financed capital invest-
ment. Indeed, capital expenditures of the general government have been relatively
high, particularly in the later years (12.5 percent of GDP in 1995 and 11.5 in 1996,
according to IMF calculations based on the Uzbek authorities’data).
Two stories motivate the extension of the model by agricultural commodities
and natural resource variables beyond the proxies already used by Berg and
others.11 First, production of these goods, which could either be sold for hard cur-
rency or may have reduced the need for hard currency imports, could have allowed
Uzbekistan to relax the tight external financing constraint, and corresponding
import constraint, that was typical for other economies in the region. As a result,
Uzbekistan may have been in a better position to maintain production in traditional
industries, by purchasing inputs and capital goods that would otherwise have
stopped flowing following the disintegration of the Soviet Union (see IMF, 1997,
paragraph three).  The second story is closely related, but focuses more on the self-
THE UZBEK GROWTH PUZZLE
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9This variable was used in spite of problems with cross-country consistency (its exact definition
depends on national fiscal authorities, and may vary from country to country) because gross fixed capital
formation in the public sector, which is taken from the national accounts, is not available for Uzbekistan
and several other transition countries in our sample. See Zettelmeyer (1998) for the exact definition and
sources of the new data used in this section.
10See the official publication, “Islom Karimov Steers Uzbekistan on its Own Way” (1997). 
11Namely, the share of agriculture in GDP prior to transition and a dummy for large raw material pro-
ducers: Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Thus, the natural resource dummy used by
Berg and others lumps Uzbekistan with the resource poor countries.sufficiency and not so much on the foreign exchange implications of domestic
energy production. This view stresses that the centrally planned supplier relation-
ships of the former Soviet Union could often not be quickly replaced by markets
and international trade, particularly in the Central Asian republics.12 Bilateral
trade and barter arrangements, which were put in place in an attempt to maintain
Soviet era goods and materials flows between the former Soviet republics, were
unreliable and plagued by inter-republican non-payment problems, especially in
the energy sector. In this setting, self-sufficiency in certain inputs, in particular
energy, may have played a special role that would gradually fade as markets devel-
oped and trade was redirected to countries outside the former East bloc.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in two steps.  First, the new variables are
given a maximum chance of “resolving” the Uzbek growth puzzle by not only
adding them to the model by Berg and others used before, but by redoing the gen-
eral-to-specific model selection methodology in the presence of these variables.13
We see which, if any, of the new variables survive the selection process, and
whether or not the “growth puzzle” re-emerges in the context of the revamped
model. Second, we test the hypothesis that the improvement in the model’s ability
to fit the Uzbek experience is due to the fact that the new variables are merely
proxying an “Uzbekistan effect,” which we still have failed to properly identify.
This is achieved by checking the robustness of the earlier results.
The Growth Puzzle Revisited
The following compares fitted growth paths for Uzbekistan and the average of other
BRO economies based on models derived through an analogous procedure as the
model used so far, that is, beginning with a very wide set of variables—which now
include the commodity, energy, and investment variables discussed above—and then
simplifying (eliminating or restricting variables) in the same basic order as Berg and
others.14 To deal with the problem that energy production is probably endogenous to
same-year industrial activity, and thus to output, first lags are used, either directly or
as instruments. The new variables were simplified last, as they are of special interest
in this paper and we want to give them a maximum opportunity of playing a role in
the final model. The set of surviving variables was somewhat sensitive to variations
in the order of elimination, and in particular, there are two alternative final models
with different statistically significant sets of the new variables. The coefficients for
these two sets are shown in Table 4 (see Appendix for the full models).
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12This is closely related to ideas explored by Blanchard and Kremer (1997), who emphasize the
breakdown of specific relationships in the absence of fully developed markets as a main factor behind the
output decline.
13The presence of the new series may have a bearing on which other variables (in particular, within
the set of initial conditions) enter the final model and how they enter it. Repeating the model selection
process rather than simply tacking on the new variables thus allows a more precise estimation of the new
coefficients and improves the fit of the model.
14For a complete list and definition of the variables introduced, including those that did not survive
the elimination process, see Zettelmeyer (1998). Note that the output growth data was also revised model
by Berg and others that was used in Part I is based on April 1997 data. While this had some effect on the
estimated coefficients, it does not affect any of the conclusions.Table 4 shows a positive effect of cotton production and a negative effect of
non-cotton agricultural production (mainly wheat), although only the former is
robust across the two variations of the model. One interpretation could be that
cotton was more internationally marketable and/or less subject to barter arrange-
ments than wheat and thus more likely to lead to actual foreign exchange earn-
ings. Also, in many transition economies wheat production went along with
subsidies to consumers, while cotton earnings were often used to subsidize indus-
try.15 Energy self-sufficiency has the expected positive sign in model A, but was
insignificant and eliminated in model B. In contrast, the model finds a negative
effect of energy exports in both variations. The last two findings contradict the
view that energy production matters mainly as a way of generating cash, but are
consistent with the idea that there may have been a special advantage to having
one’s own inputs in a period when traditional interrepublican trade patterns were
disrupted and new trade patterns had yet to be formed. This said, the negative
coefficient on energy exports remains something of a puzzle, though perhaps a
puzzle with precedents.16
Public capital expenditure did not survive as a determinant of growth in
either version.17 This could be because this variable is truly unrelated to growth
in transition, perhaps because the state tends to direct investment to the wrong
THE UZBEK GROWTH PUZZLE
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Table 4. Energy and Agriculture Coefficients in Two Variants 
of Extended Model
(dependent variable: real output growth, in percent)
Model Variables Coefficient t-value
A Cotton production value ($ per capita) 0.050 2.394
Energy self-sufficiency index (lag)1 2.727 1.704
Energy exports index (lag)1 –2.878 –2.030
B Cotton production value ($ per capita) 0.062 3.133
Value of non-cotton agricultural commodities ($ per capita) –0.047 –3.246
Energy exports index (lag)2 –3.384 –2.448
Note: A and B also differ with respect to some variables not shown in the table. For the full
models, see Appendix, Table A1.
1Defined as the ratio of energy production over energy consumption (both in energy units) if
this ratio is smaller than one and as one if the ratio is bigger than one. First lags were used to avoid
endogeneity (see footnote 8)
2Defined as the difference between the ratio of energy production over energy consumption and
the energy self-sufficiency index. First lags were used.
15I thank Peter Keller for suggesting this interpretation. 
16Two well-known examples for the actual or potential counterproductiveness of resource riches are
the Dutch disease and the negative impact of large natural resource endowments in long-term growth
regressions. On the latter, see Sachs and Warner (1995).
17Because public investment data was not available for the whole sample, the capacity of this variable
to explain growth was explored in the context of a general-to-specific exercise performed on a subsample.
After finding that public investment was not significant (even when ordered at the end of the elimination
process) the exercise was repeated on the whole sample without controlling for public investment. Models
A and B are based on this second exercise.Jeromin Zettelmeyer
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industries.18 Alternatively, it is possible that the variable is so mismeasured (in
the sense of cross-country inconsistencies; see footnote 9) that any positive
effect is biased toward zero and undetectable.
The next step is to see how well the two models explain the Uzbek output path.
Table 5 is the equivalent of Table 2 for models A and B.
As Table 5 shows, the ability of the two models to fit the Uzbek growth experi-
ence is almost the same, with very similar paths of residuals for Uzbekistan. Both
models still have some difficulty in explaining why Uzbek output declined so little in
1994 (transition year 2) and why it began to recover in 1996 (transition year 4).19
18The conventional interpretation that public investment crowds out private investment through a macro-
economic (interest rate) effect is less plausible here, as both models A and B control for the fiscal balance.
19Note that the ability of models A and B to predict the Uzbek recovery in 1996 is slightly worse than
that of the model by Berg and others (the latter predicted zero growth; the models above slightly negative
growth). As a matter of model mechanics, this is just an artifact of the fact that the ratio between energy pro-
duction and consumption sharply increases for Uzbekistan in 1995, making Uzbekistan an energy exporter
according to the definition used in this paper. From Table 4, it is clear that the latter has a negative impact on
fitted growth for 1996. The question what drives the modest turnaround in growth in 1996 can thus not be
answered based on the regression model used in this paper, and is addressed in a companion paper (Taube and
Zettelmeyer, 1998), by examining sectoral growth patterns.
Table 5. Uzbekistan and Transition Economy Average: 
Fitted and Actual Growth Paths
(in percent per year)
Transition Time
0 1 2 3 4
Model A
Average of Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the Former Soviet Union (BRO), 
excluding Uzbekistan
Actual growth –22.3 –12.9 –13.4 –4.1 –1.0
Fitted growth –22.3 –12.7 –12.5 –3.2 –1.1
Residual 0.0 –0.2 –0.9 –0.9 0.2
Average of absolute residual 2.3 3.2 4.8 3.1 5.2
Uzbekistan
Actual growth –11.1 –2.3 –4.2 –0.9 1.6
Fitted growth –10.0 –2.2 –8.9 –0.2 –2.2
Residual –1.1 –0.1 4.7 –0.7 3.8
Absolute residual 1.1 0.1 4.7 0.7 3.8
Model B
BRO Average, excluding Uzbekistan
Actual growth –22.3 –12.9 –13.4 –4.1 –1.0
Fitted growth –22.2 –13.2 –12.6 –3.9 –1.4
Residual –0.1 0.3 –0.8 –0.2 0.4
Average of absolute residual 2.3 3.1 4.1 2.9 5.3
Uzbekistan
Actual growth –11.1 –2.3 –4.2 –0.9 1.6
Fitted growth –11.6 –0.6 –8.4 0.2 –1.5
Residual 0.5 –1.7 4.2 –1.1 3.1
Absolute residual 0.5 1.7 4.2 1.1 3.1However, the main result from the table is that, based on the criteria used in Section I
to decide whether a “growth puzzle” existed, the Uzbek growth puzzle vanishes. First,
the residuals for Uzbekistan are no longer all on one side; that is, some are positive
and some are negative. Thus, Uzbek growth during transition is no longer systemati-
cally underpredicted. Second, as is apparent from comparing the lines showing abso-
lute residuals, the model now actually does somewhat better in fitting the Uzbek path
than it does in fitting the path of the average BRO economy. Given that the model was
extended by including variables suspected to contribute particularly to explaining the
Uzbek experience, this is perhaps not surprising. Note, however, that the ability of the
model to explain growth in the BRO economies other than Uzbekistan is still at least
as good as in the model used by Berg and others.
As one would expect, the much milder output decline in Uzbekistan relative
to the average BRO country is now attributable to both the initial conditions group
(maintaining the same definition as in Table 3) and the new set of energy and agri-
culture variables (Table 6). As in Table 3, Uzbekistan’s macroeconomic and struc-
tural policies would ceteris paribus have lead to a lower output path relative to the
average for the Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union.
This is more than offset, however, by the effect of cotton production and (in model
A) energy self-sufficiency, as well as by more favorable initial conditions (as
before, mainly low industrialization). The relative advantage imparted by the ini-
tial conditions is again concentrated in the first two years, but the positive impact
attributed to the new variables is much more sustained.
Robustness
Before concluding, a methodological caveat needs to be addressed. Suppose that
the Uzbek puzzle was in fact attributable to some yet unidentified variable that
happened to be correlated with the “new variables” identified in the previous sec-
tion, merely because they take on unusual values for Uzbekistan. Then, this could
generate the results of the previous section. To take an extreme example, suppose
that Uzbekistan were the sole transition economy producing cotton. Then, the
inclusion of cotton production in the regression model would amount 
to including an Uzbekistan dummy, which we know would be highly significant
and resolve the “puzzle”—even if the mildness of Uzbekistan’s output decline 
had entirely different causes. Fortunately, this possibility can be tested by
re-estimating the model after excluding Uzbekistan from the sample and seeing
how this affects the outcome (Table 7).
Table 7 sends a mixed message. With one exception, all the energy and agricul-
ture coefficients in Table 7 lose their statistical significance when estimated without
the Uzbek sample points. They also drop in value. Thus, it is correct to say that the
strength of the estimated effect of the energy and agriculture variables is driven by
the Uzbek “outlier.” But while the coefficients drop in value, they are, in economic
terms, still quite close (between 50 and 80 percent of the values based on the full
sample). Moreover, the fact that they are estimated too imprecisely to be signifi-
cantly different from zero cuts both ways—it implies that the old values are well
within the standard error of the new values. Thus, the coefficients and t-values
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Table 6. Uzbekistan and Transition Economy Average: 
Contributions of Major Groups of Variables to Fitted Growth
(in percent per year)
Transition Time
0 1 2 3 4
Model A
Average of Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union (BRO), 
excluding Uzbekistan
Fitted growth –22.3 –12.7 –12.5 –3.2 –1.1
Macroeconomic policy –1.3 2.3 2.2 1.6 1.9
Structural reforms 9.7 9.0 11.0 13.6 13.6
Initial conditions + constant –28.5 –21.7 –26.1 –20.1 –17.4
War –3.4 –3.4 –0.8 –0.2 –0.4
New variables 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.2
Cotton 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.4
Energy 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.8
Uzbekistan
Fitted growth –10.0 –2.2 –8.9 –0.2 –2.2
Macroeconomic policy –5.8 1.1 0.5 0.8 0.7
Structural reforms 7.8 3.3 7.7 9.8 10.9
Initial conditions + constant –18.3 –13.1 –24.6 –19.7 –19.9
War 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
New variables 6.4 6.5 7.6 8.9 6.2
Cotton 3.9 3.9 5.0 6.2 4.1
Energy 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.1
Model B
BRO average, excluding Uzbekistan
Fitted growth –22.2 –13.2 –12.6 –3.9 –1.4
Macroeconomic policy –1.8 2.1 2.2 1.5 1.7
Structural reforms 7.1 6.9 7.4 10.2 11.3
Initial conditions + constant –23.3 –17.6 –20.1 –14.3 –12.0
War –2.7 –2.7 –0.7 –0.2 –0.3
New variables –1.6 –1.9 –1.5 –1.1 –2.1
Cotton 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.3 0.5
Non-cotton agri. commodities –1.5 –1.9 –1.5 –1.7 –1.9
Energy –0.9 –0.9 –1.0 –0.7 –0.7
Uzbekistan
Fitted growth –11.5 –0.5 –8.4 0.2 –1.4
Macroeconomic policy –6.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6
Structural reforms 5.0 2.4 2.3 4.5 6.5
Initial conditions + constant –13.6 –7.8 –16.6 –11.5 –11.5
War 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
New variables 3.9 4.1 5.3 6.4 3.1
Cotton 4.8 4.8 6.2 7.8 5.2
Non-cotton agri. commodities  –0.9 –0.8 –0.9 –1.3 –1.3
Energy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.8shown in Table 7 could well be consistent with the hypothesis that they are alterna-
tive estimates of the same underlying coefficient. This is confirmed by a Chow test
for predictive stability, which is nowhere near a rejection of the null of structural sta-
bility (p-values of 75 and 85 percent for Models A and B, respectively).
On this basis, one should be inclined to take the previous results seriously, that is,
go with the coefficients that were estimated on the whole sample. However, the pos-
sibility remains that the structural stability test might have failed to reject the null
merely because of a lack of informative data in the sample that excludes Uzbekistan,
and estimation based on the whole sample could thus give misleading estimates of the
true coefficients on commodities and energy for the reasons discussed previously. To
see what this “worst case” would imply for our ability to explain the Uzbek growth
puzzle, consider the fitted values that would arise if the coefficients from the regres-
sion on the sample excluding Uzbekistan are used (Table 8).
Does the growth puzzle re-emerge when using coefficients estimated on a sub-
sample that excludes the Uzbek experience? It depends. Based on Model A, the
finding that the model underpredicts Uzbek growth year after year still holds;
based on Model B, this finding is true in four out of five years. However, the sum
of absolute residuals for Uzbekistan is only insignificantly higher than that for the
average BRO economy in Model A (19.3 versus 18.6), while Model B still does
better at fitting the Uzbek growth path than that of the average BRO economy
(14.2 versus 17.6). Thus, the capacity of the model to explain the Uzbek experi-
ence improves decisively after including agricultural commodity and energy vari-
ables in the model even if the coefficients are estimated on a sample that entirely
ignores the Uzbek experience.
III. Conclusion
This paper has two main findings. The first is that the exceptional mildness of
Uzbekistan’s transitional recession can be largely accounted for by a combination
of its low degree of initial industrialization, its cotton production, and its near self-
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Table 7. Energy/Agriculture Coefficients
With and Without Using Uzbek Data
(dependent variable: real output growth, in percent)
Excluding 
Full Sample  Uzbek data
Model Variables Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
A Cotton production value ($ per capita) 0.050 2.394 0.025 0.79
Energy exports index (lag) –2.878 –2.03 –1.651 –0.887
Energy self-sufficiency index (lag) 2.727 1.704 2.186 1.266
B Cotton production value ($ per capita) 0.062 3.133 0.045 1.408
Value of non-cotton agricultural commodities –0.047 –3.246 –0.046 –3.109
Energy exports index (lag) –3.384 –2.448 –2.592 –1.411sufficiency in energy. The relative importance of these factors, in particular the lat-
ter two, remains uncertain. Second, it is unlikely that the government’s public
investment program and import substitution strategy (except where it related to the
energy sector) has played an important role in achieving Uzbekistan’s favorable
output performance. Specifically, no statistically significant effect of public capi-
tal expenditure on growth performance could be detected in a wide cross-section
of transition economies; and the hypothesis that Uzbek growth obeys the same
structural determinants as the other transition economies could not be rejected for
a cross-country model that controlled for the agriculture and energy variables
mentioned above (along with standard initial conditions and policy indices), but
not for public investment and other Uzbek policy idiosyncracies such as import
substitution.
Several caveats remain. First, the negative results regarding the role of public
investment and the failure to reject structural stability in the extended model could be
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Table 8. Uzbekistan and Transition Economy Average: Fitted and Actual
Growth Paths Using Coefficients Estimated Excluding Uzbekistan
(in percent per year)
Transition Time
0 1 2 3 4
Model A
Average of Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union (BRO), 
excluding Uzbekistan
Actual growth –22.3 –12.9 –13.4 –4.1 –1.0
Fitted growth –22.2 –12.7 –12.7 –3.4 –1.0
Residual –0.2 –0.2 –0.7 –0.7 0.1
Average of absolute residual 2.4 3.2 4.8 3.1 5.2
Uzbekistan
Actual growth –11.1 –2.3 –4.2 –0.9 1.6
Fitted growth –11.9 –4.3 –12.0 –3.7 –4.3
Residual 0.8 2.0 7.8 2.8 5.9
Absolute residual 0.8 2.0 7.8 2.8 5.9
Model B.
Average of Baltics, Russia, and other countries of the former Soviet Union (BRO), 
excluding Uzbekistan
Actual growth –22.3 –12.9 –13.4 –4.1 –1.0
Fitted growth –22.3 –13.1 –12.8 –4.1 –1.3
Residual –0.1 0.2 –0.6 0.0 0.3
Average of absolute residual 2.3 3.1 4.1 2.9 5.2
Uzbekistan
Actual growth –11.1 –2.3 –4.2 –0.9 1.6
Fitted growth –13.0 –1.6 –10.4 –2.0 –2.6
Residual 1.9 –0.7 6.2 1.1 4.2
Absolute residual 1.9 0.7 6.2 1.1 4.2attributable to lack of power due to noisy data. Second, even accepting that the find-
ings regarding public investment are correct, there remains an ambiguity in how to
interpret the relative roles of policies and initial conditions in explaining the mildness
of Uzbekistan’s transitional recession. One interpretation is simply that Uzbekistan
did relatively well because favorable initial conditions—broadly defined to include
energy and cotton production—more than offset the effects of bad macroeconomic
and structural reform policies. This interpretation would stress the finding that
Uzbekistan’s macroeconomic and reform policies are shown to contribute less to
growth, ceteris paribus, than in other transition economies, as well as the failure to
detect a structural break between the observations for Uzbekistan and the remainder
of the sample, which suggests that the assumption of homogeneous policy effects
across countries is justified. However, it is possible that the estimated effect of the
energy and agriculture variables does not just reflect the availability of natural
resources as such, but the impact of sectoral policies that tended to go along with
these variables (controlling for macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization).
Moreover, it remains true that the effect of energy and agriculture is weaker if
Uzbekistan is excluded from the sample. On this basis, an alternative interpretation of
the results is that Uzbekistan did relatively well in terms of aggregate output because
it managed to mitigate the collapse of the (relatively small) industrial sectors by com-
bining rigid state control with subsidies that were in large part financed by cotton
exports and by developing the energy sector for domestic uses. While some other
countries tried similar policies, particularly at the beginning of transition, these may
have been less viable because they violated financing constraints at an earlier stage.
As a result, there is no easy answer to the question of whether Uzbekistan could
have done better by pursuing more vigorous liberalization and reform policies from
the beginning. In the model used in this paper, faster reform would have led to
higher growth through the measured macroeconomic and structural policy vari-
ables, reflecting mainly the positive impact of reforms on the newly developing pri-
vate sector.  However, if the interpretation is right that the contribution of the energy
and agricultural variables reflect a combination of natural resources and the way in
which they were exploited, then taking away part of this package—state control and
cross-subsidization, which in the model go along with low structural reform indi-
cators—might have led to a bigger output collapse, at least temporarily.
In conclusion, while the results stress the importance of favorable initial condi-
tions in explaining Uzbekistan’s relative success, they allow for the possibility that
this success was also related to Uzbekistan’s sectoral policies, particularly during the
early transition years. This need not imply that these policies were optimal given the
circumstances,20 and even less that they should be continued. As the economic and
social turmoil that resulted from the breakup of the Soviet Union subsides, it becomes
ever harder to argue in favor of the extensive state control of economic decisions that
has characterized the Uzbek experience so far.
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20Given the disincentives to production implicit in Uzbekistan’s policy approach (including in the
agriculture sector), it is hard to imagine that Uzbekistan’s approach was optimal even from the narrow per-
spective of the aggregate output effects of policies, that is, ignoring environmental and broader welfare
issues. However, this is not a conclusion that can be narrowly based on the findings of this paper. APPENDIX
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Table A1. Models A and B
Model A Model B
Variable Definition Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant regression constant –18.99 –5.69 –7.78 –2.14
Fbal fiscal balance, in percent of GDP 0.81 5.37 0.91 6.27
lFbal l* Fbal –1.52 –3.31 –1.66 –3.76
Fbal–1s (first lag of Fbal)*s  –0.07 –0.52 –0.06 –0.44
lFbal–1s l*(first lag of Fbal)*s  –0.52 –1.18 –0.64 –1.50
Fbal–2s (second lag of Fbal)*s  0.42 2.93 0.39 2.69
lFbal–2s l*(second lag of Fbal)*s  –1.01 –2.73 –0.86 –2.31
Infa natural log of (1+average inflation) 3.20 2.55 3.43 2.70
lInfa l*Infa –5.79 –1.78 –6.03 –1.79
LII internal liberalization index 19.38 5.46 . . . . . .
lLII–1s l*(first lag of LII)*s  . . . . . . 38.97 3.02
DLII–1s D[(first lag of LII)*s] –19.74 –1.90 . . . . . .
DlLII–1s D[lLII–1s] 54.77 1.73 . . . . . .
LIE external liberalization index . . . . . . 33.13 4.97
lLIE l*LIE . . . . . . –64.84 –3.57
LIP–1s (first lag of private sector conditions index)*s . . . . . . –30.64 –3.21
lLIP–1s l*LIP–1s . . . . . . 48.16 2.54
DLIP–2s D[(second lag of pr. sector conds. index)*s] –30.11 –2.38 –44.60 –2.84
DlLIP–2s D[l*(second lag of pr. sector conds. index)*s] 50.57 1.73 92.00 2.50
Warupd dummy variable for war or internal conflict –11.81 –6.97 –9.48 –5.58
lGrIni0 l*(average pre–transition growth)*d –14.95 –3.32 –18.51 –4.16
dFbal–1 d*Fbal–1 1.68 3.42 1.22 2.63
dlFbal–1 d*lFbal–1 –11.51 –4.84 –9.29 –4.16
dInfa–1 d*(first lag of Infa) –38.42 –3.69 –36.92 –4.00
dlInfa–1 d*l*(first lag of Infa) 125.66 2.94 115.50 3.05
RepInfD1 pre-transition repressed inflation*D1 0.84 3.14 1.04 3.80
lRepInfD1 l*RepInfD1 –2.65 –2.81 –3.53 –3.79
NatRRD3 (resource–rich country dummy)*D3 –8.81 –4.81 –8.18 –4.91
UrbanD1 (pre-transition degree of urbanization)*D1 –0.46 –4.12 –0.60 –4.64
lUrbanD1 l*UrbanD1 2.67 3.45 3.36 4.05
TraddeptD2 (pre-transition trade dependency)*t*D2 –0.10 –3.99 –0.17 –5.65
TraddepO2 (pre-transition trade dependency)*O2 . . . . . . –0.15 –2.99
lUrbantD1 l*UrbanD1*t –0.94 –2.18 –1.32 –2.89
AgSh89tD2c (1989 share of agriculture in GDP)*D2*(t–2) –93.76 –4.58 –73.44 –3.75
lAgSh89tD2c l*AgSh89tD2c 478.01 4.71 399.11 3.97
lOverInd l*(initial over-industrialization index) 20.19 3.24 . . . . . .
lOvIndtD1c lOverInd*D1*(t–1) 177.65 3.97 202.09 4.34
CottonVPC value of cotton production, $/capita 0.05 2.39 0.06 3.13
nonCottonAgVPC value of non-cotton agricultural cash crops, $/cap . . . . . . –0.05 –3.25
Ebal–1 first lag energy balance index –2.88 –2.03 . . . . . .
Esuf–1 first lag of energy self-sufficiency index 5.61 2.79 . . . . . .
Eexp–1 Ebal–1 – Esuf–1 . . . . . . –3.38 –2.45Notes:
The notation conventions used in variable definitions are as follows:
All variables are implicitly indexed by transition time t and country i.
t denotes the transition year (t = –2,–1, 0, 1, ... Ti,where Ti is the last transition year
in the sample for country i).
d denotes a dummy variable that takes the value 0 in transition years (t ³ 0) and 1 in
pre-transition years (t < 0); s º 1–d (for all countries).
D[...] denotes the first difference operator.
The prefix l denotes the estimated share of the private sector in GDP.
Dj denotes a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for t smaller or equal i and 0 else;
Oj = 1 – Dj (for all countries).
For a detailed explanation of the econometric methodology and motivation underlying the
variable definitions, see Berg and others (1999).  For a discussion of the structural reform
indices and initial conditions (pre-transition variables) used in model A and B, their sources and
construction, see Berg and others (1999); de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996); and de Melo,
Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev (1997).
For discussion and sources of the energy variables in the table, see text and Zettelmeyer
(1998). The agricultural variables in the table were constructed as follows. CottonVPC is the
value of cotton production per capita using cotton lint production data from the FAO Yearbook
Production, 1991–1996 volumes, and price data (Liverpool Index) from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics. NonCottonAgVPC is the aggregate production value of the
following crops: Wheat, Rice, Maize, Sorghum, Soybeans, Groundnuts and Tobacco, using data
from the same sources.
The standard regression statistics for the two models are as follows:
Model A: R2 = 0.87, DW = 1.66, RSS = 2231.7 for 34 variables and 143 observations
Model B: R2 = 0.88, DW = 1.96, RSS = 2070.1 for 36 variables and 143 observations.
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